

### Procedures for applying the compensation policy in exceptional circumstances

In exceptional circumstances, in accordance with Article L.22-10-8 III, 2° of the French Commercial Code, the Board of Directors may depart from the application of the components of the compensation policy if the legal requirements are met. The deviation must be temporary, in keeping with the Company's interests and necessary to safeguard its continued operation or viability. It could notably apply in the event of a significant change in the Group's scope, the acquisition or establishment of a significant new business, the discontinuation of a significant business or a major external event affecting (i) the achievement of one or more performance criteria, or (ii) Legrand's markets and/or major competitors.

The Board of Directors would decide on any adjustments to the compensation policy in exceptional circumstances, based

on a proposal by the Compensation Committee. As part of this approach, the Board of Directors may, after consulting the Compensation Committee, adjust either upwards or downwards the performance criteria (objectives, targets, weightings, trigger threshold, etc.) for the annual and long-term variable compensation. Note that the overall cap for this compensation may not be modified in any circumstances.

Where adjustments are made, the Board would carefully reflect the executive's performance and maintain the correlation between compensation and the Company's performance.

The Board of Directors should continue to respect the principles set out in the compensation policy and provide shareholders with a clear, precise and complete explanation of its choice. These adjustments would then be put to an *ex-post* vote at the Shareholders' Meeting and have to be duly justified by the Board.

## 6.2.2 - Compensation policy applicable to the company officers in respect of 2026

### 6.2.2.1 Compensation policy for the Chair of the Board of Directors in respect of 2026

#### A – Term of office of the Chair of the Board of Directors

The Board of Directors elects from among its members a Chair who must be an individual below the age of 65 upon appointment. The Chair may be reappointed. The Chair of the Board of Directors may resign from office at any time without giving any notice. The Board of Directors may dismiss the Chair at any time without giving any notice. The term of office of the Chair of the Board of Directors is the same as that of their term of office as a director, currently three years.

Angeles Garcia-Poveda was appointed as Chair of the Board of Directors on July 1, 2020, replacing Gilles Schnepf. Her term of office as a director and Chair of the Board of Directors was renewed on May 31, 2023. The renewal of her term of office as a director of the Company will be proposed at the forthcoming Shareholders' Meeting on May 27, 2026. It is also envisaged that she will be reappointed as Chair of the Board of Directors. For further information, please refer to the presentation of the agenda and the proposed resolutions available on the Company's website: [www.legrand.com/en](http://www.legrand.com/en) in the "INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS/Shareholders' meetings/2026 General Meeting" section.

The current Chair of the Board of Directors is not bound by any contract of employment or service agreement with the Company or any other Group company.

#### B – Compensation of the Chair of the Board of Directors in respect of 2026

The annual fixed compensation of the Chair of the Board of Directors is determined by the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee. It is determined in accordance with the principles stated in section 6.2.1, and in line with the responsibilities and duties assumed by the Chair of the Board of Directors. The main elements taken into account in determining that compensation are as follows:

- the role of the Chair of the Board of Directors in organizing and directing the work of the Board of Directors;
- the skills and experience of the Chair of the Board of Directors; and
- the benchmarking of compensation practices for non-executive chairs of CAC 40 companies.

Accordingly, the Board of Directors held on March 18, 2026, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, considered that the compensation structure of the Chair of the Board of Directors in respect of 2026 was adequate. It consists solely of fixed compensation of €625,000. That decision was made taking into account market practices and benchmarks.

Furthermore, the Board of Directors, on March 18, 2026, on the proposal of the Compensation Committee, decided that the Chair of the Board of Directors could continue to benefit from the "medical expenses" supplementary health insurance and the "death, disability and inability to work" insurance available to the Group's French executives under exactly the same terms since she is classified as an executive for social

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security and tax purposes. She receives those benefits on the same terms as the other employees in that category.

The Company's contribution in respect of the Chair of the Board of Directors would amount to €7,796 for 2026. This amount is given for information purposes only.

In addition, the Chair of the Board of Directors could continue to receive the benefit of the mandatory collective defined-contribution pension plan that falls within the scope of supplementary Article 83 of the French General Tax Code (**FGTC**), under the same terms as all other relevant employees.

All the Group's French executives qualify for the benefit of the defined-contribution pension plan. Contributions are based on the A, B and C Tranches of compensation as defined for the calculation of contributions to the mandatory supplementary pension plans (AGIRC-ARRCO). Entitlements accrue through the payment of annual contributions equal to 1.5% of the A, B and C Tranches. The Company pays half this amount (0.75%) and the beneficiaries pay the other half (0.75%).

The Company's contribution in respect of the Chair of the Board of Directors would amount to €2,884 for 2026. This amount is given for information purposes only.

## 6.2.2.2 Compensation policy for the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

### A – Term of office of the Chief Executive Officer

The Chief Executive Officer is appointed by the Board of Directors, which determines his compensation and the length of his duties. The Chief Executive Officer must always be an individual below the age of 65 upon appointment. The Chief Executive Officer may resign from office at any time without giving any notice. The Board of Directors may dismiss the Chief Executive Officer at any time without giving any notice.

Benoît Coquart was appointed Chief Executive Officer effective February 8, 2018 for an indefinite term. He was also appointed as a director of the Company initially at the Shareholders' Meeting of May 27, 2020 and reappointed at the Shareholders' Meeting of May 31, 2023.

The renewal of his term of office as a director of the Company will be proposed at the forthcoming Shareholders' Meeting on May 27, 2026. For further information, please refer to the presentation of the agenda and the proposed resolutions available on the Company's website: [www.legrand.com/en](http://www.legrand.com/en) in the "INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS/Shareholders' meetings/2026 General Meeting" section.

The Chief Executive Officer is not bound by any contract of employment or service agreement with the Company or any other Group company.

### B – Overall structure of compensation attributable to the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

The Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, defines the compensation policy applicable to the Chief Executive Officer based on all the criteria and principles stated in section 6.2.1 of this chapter.

The compensation has three components:

- annual fixed compensation ;
- annual variable compensation linked to annual financial and non-financial performance ; and
- long-term compensation linked to financial and non-financial performance over the long term.

The Chief Executive Officer's annual fixed compensation is determined in line with his responsibilities and duties.

In accordance with the Code of Corporate Governance, the Board of Directors ensures that the long-term compensation mechanisms should aim to retain the loyalty of executives and align their interests with those of the Company and all its stakeholders.

The Board of Directors therefore wishes to promote annual variable compensation and long-term compensation to help foster retention and to provide an incentive for financial and non-financial performance.

At its March 18, 2026 meeting, the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, proposes, subject to shareholder approval at the May 27, 2026 Shareholders' Meeting, increasing the Chief Executive Officer's fixed compensation from €900,000 to €1,100,000, representing a 22.2% increase in the fixed compensation and a 22.2% increase in the target total compensation<sup>(1)</sup>. This adjustment aims to position the Chief Executive Officer's compensation at a consistent and reasonable level relative to the companies in the CAC 40, the Group's benchmark index.

This reassessment of the Chief Executive Officer's compensation was decided by the Board of Directors on March 18, 2026, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, based on the following factors:

- the Group's development since 2021, when the Chief Executive Officer's compensation policy was modified most recently, both in terms of its size (over 39,600 employees worldwide, presence in close to 90 countries and marketing activities in close to 180 countries) and its complexity and scope (27 acquisitions completed since 2021) ;
- the Group's performances between 2021 and 2025 under the leadership of the Chief Executive Officer: over this period, sales grew by 35.5%, adjusted operating margin rose by 36.8% and the share price moved up 74.3% ;
- the absence of any increase in Benoît Coquart's fixed compensation since 2021 ;

(1) Including fixed compensation, target annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value. The increase in maximum total compensation including fixed compensation, maximum annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value amounts to 22.2%.

- the conclusions of the benchmarking studies vis-à-vis CAC 40 companies, showing a gap between the current positioning of the Chief Executive Officer's compensation and Legrand's positioning within this index.

These analyses highlighted that the Chief Executive Officer's fixed compensation has been at the lowest level of the CAC 40 index since 2024, and that his target total compensation<sup>(1)</sup> of €3,199,261 remains below the first quartile of the index, which stands at €4,036,000.

The Group's market capitalization, which was €40,346 million at March 2, 2026, lay between the first quartile of the CAC 40 index (€19,602 million) and its median (€42,835 million).

After the increase, the fixed compensation would lie between the first quartile and the median for the CAC 40 and close to the first quartile for target total compensation, a level that the Board of Directors considered to be consistent with Legrand's positioning within the index and the Group's profile.

The Board of Directors has therefore established the following compensation structure for the Chief Executive Officer in 2026:

Component	Purpose and link with the strategy	Operation	Amount/percentage weighting of fixed compensation
Fixed	Provide compensation for the scope and level of responsibility	Determined by the Board of Directors, fairly and competitively, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, in consideration of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>level of responsibility;</li> <li>skills and experience;</li> <li>market practices of CAC 40 companies.</li> </ul>	€1,100,000
Annual variable	Provide an incentive to achieve the Company's annual financial and non-financial targets	Determined by the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of Compensation Committee, according to strategic priorities and based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>order of magnitude of variable compensation relative to fixed compensation;</li> <li>annual objectives to be achieved;</li> <li>type and weighting of performance criteria;</li> <li>proportion of quantifiable and qualitative components.</li> </ul> <p><b>of which quantifiable (80%):</b> structured to encourage the achievement of specific and ambitious performance criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>financial (organic growth, adjusted operating margin before acquisitions, external growth);</li> <li>non-financial (rate of achievement of the Group's 2025-2027 CSR Roadmap with five pillars: promoting diversity and inclusion, mitigating climate change, developing a more circular economy, serving our customers and being a responsible business).</li> </ul> <p><b>of which qualitative (20%):</b> structured to take account of the year's initiatives deployed to support growth and people development.</p>	Minimum value: 0% of fixed compensation  Target value: 100% of fixed compensation  Maximum value: 150% of fixed compensation
Long-term	Spur higher long-term financial and non-financial performance  Retain and build loyalty over the long term	Determined by the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, according to strategic priorities and based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>objectives to be achieved;</li> <li>type and weighting of future performance criteria.</li> </ul> <p>Determined after application of a continuing service requirement and four demanding performance criteria (each counting for a quarter) measured over 3 years:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>target for sales growth excluding currency effects (3-year average of achievement rates);</li> <li>target for adjusted operating margin after acquisitions (3-year average of achievement rates);</li> <li>rate of achievement of the Group's CSR Roadmap (3-year average of achievement rates);</li> <li>Legrand's share price performance relative to the performance of the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods &amp; Services index (performance gap measured over a 3-year period).</li> </ul>	Minimum value: 0%  Awarded value (target value): 200% of fixed compensation  Maximum value: 150% of the number of shares initially awarded depending on the future achievement of performance criteria

(1) Including fixed compensation, target annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value. The increase in maximum total compensation including fixed compensation, maximum annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value amounts to 22.2%.

## Implementation of the compensation policy for the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

The Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, decided on the following principles regarding the compensation policy for the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026.

### ■ Annual fixed compensation amounting to €1,100,000.

This amount was set by the Board of Directors on March 18, 2026, after considering the requisite level of responsibility, profile and experience, as well as market practices among CAC 40 companies. An increase was proposed relative to 2025 annual fixed compensation to position the Chief Executive Officer's compensation at a level that is consistent and reasonable relative to CAC 40 companies, the Group's benchmark index.

After the increase, the fixed compensation would lie between the first quartile and the median for the CAC 40, a level that the Board of Directors considered consistent with Legrand's positioning within the index and with the Group's profile.

### ■ Annual variable compensation, with a target value set at 100% of annual fixed compensation (80% quantifiable and 20% qualitative).

It may vary between 0% and 150% of fixed compensation, depending on the level of achievement of the quantifiable and qualitative criteria detailed in the "Quantifiable performance criteria selected for annual variable compensation and target-setting method" paragraph in section 6.2.2.2 C of this chapter.

### ■ Long-term compensation in the form of performance share plans, with a target value set at 200% of the annual fixed compensation.

It will entitle the recipient, where applicable, to an award of shares. The number of shares may vary thereafter between 0% and 150% of the initial award based on the level of future achievement of four financial and non-financial criteria measured on the basis of a three-year average. These criteria are detailed in the "Performance criteria selected for long-term variable compensation and target-setting method" paragraph in section 6.2.2.2 C of this chapter.

After the increase, the target total compensation<sup>(1)</sup> would lie close to the first quartile, a level that the Board of Directors considered consistent with Legrand's positioning within the index and with the Group's profile.

## C – Determination of the calculation principles, criteria and weightings applicable to the annual and long-term variable compensation components attributable to the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

### Annual variable compensation of the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

The principles for calculating the annual variable compensation in respect of 2026 include the applicable criteria and their weightings, as set out in the table below. They were determined by the Board of Directors of March 18, 2026, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee.

Under Article L.22-10-34, II. of the French Commercial Code, payment of the annual variable compensation is subject to prior approval by the Shareholders' Meeting (*ex-post* vote).

The Board of Directors of March 18, 2026 decided to leave unchanged the nature of the quantifiable and qualitative criteria relating to annual variable compensation in place since 2021, as well as their target value and their maximum value.

The Board of Directors took the view that the variable compensation criteria lie at the heart of Legrand's growth and value creation model. Legrand's expansion model has two growth engines: organic growth stimulated in particular by innovation (regular launches of new products offering enhanced value in use) and commercial initiatives (organizational, physical with, for example, the opening of showrooms, and digital), and growth through bolt-on acquisitions, which is a key component of Legrand's development model. Since 1954, the Group has acquired 202 companies. Legrand's development model stands out on account of its significant ability to adapt to economic, geopolitical and social changes in its markets. Thanks to this ability, it has maintained first-class profitability over time. As a result, the Group achieved adjusted operating margin that has represented 20% of its sales from 2010 to 2025, with a minimum of 19.0% in 2020 as a result of the pandemic crisis, and a maximum of 21% in 2023.

Legrand's strategy is driven by a responsive organization that has close ties with its markets, featuring:

- highly committed teams, comprising over 39,600 highly committed staff members across nearly 90 countries.
- a business culture that focuses on integrated performance (financial and non-financial) and operational excellence.

(1) Including fixed compensation, target annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value. The increase in maximum total compensation including fixed compensation, maximum annual variable compensation and long-term variable compensation awarded at its IFRS value amounts to 22.2%.

Quantifiable performance criteria selected for annual variable compensation and target-setting method

Performance criterion	Reason for selection of the criterion	Target-setting method
Organic sales growth	Alignment with annual public targets	The range bounds for the performance targets are consistent with the Company's annual targets, announced to the market upon publication of the annual financial statements of the previous year (in February)
Adjusted operating margin before acquisitions	Alignment with annual public targets	
External growth	Fit with the Group's growth model	Fit with the Group's growth model (measured by sales growth during the year resulting from changes in scope)
Rate of achievement of the CSR Roadmap	The CSR Roadmap is central to the Group's growth model. It aims to ensure that the Group achieves profitable, sustainable and responsible growth	Fit with the Group's corporate social and environmental responsibility commitments under its CSR Roadmap

Qualitative performance criteria selected for annual variable compensation and target-setting method

Performance criterion	Reason for selection of the criterion	Target-setting method
Innovation and market positions	Alignment with the Group's strategic priorities	At the beginning of the year, the Board makes certain that the criteria adopted are aligned with the Group's strategic priorities and sets targets.
Quality of external growth		Achievement of the qualitative criteria applicable to annual variable compensation is assessed at the discretion of the Board of Directors, on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, based on information presented by management.
People development		

Criteria and targets for annual variable compensation for 2026

				Min	Target	Max		
<b>Quantifiable: 80% of target fixed compensation</b>	Organic sales growth	2026 organic sales growth	As a % of fixed compensation	0%	15%	22.5%		
			Indicator value	3.5%	5.5%	7.5%		
	Operating margin	2026 adjusted operating margin (at 2025 scope)	As a % of fixed compensation	0%	40%	60%		
			Indicator value	20.5%	20.9%	21.3%		
	External growth	2026 sales growth resulting from changes in scope	As a % of fixed compensation	0%	10%	15%		
			Indicator value	0%	5%	10%		
	Corporate Social Responsibility	2026 rate of achievement of the Group's CSR Roadmap <sup>(1)</sup>	As a % of fixed compensation	0%	15%	22.5%		
			Indicator value	70%	100%	130%		
<b>QUANTIFIABLE TOTAL</b>				<b>0%</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>120%</b>		
<b>Qualitative: 20% of target fixed compensation</b>	Innovation and market positions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Innovation and Research &amp; Development (new products and transformation of manufacturing processes)</li> <li>■ Trend in sales generated by products supporting the energy and digital transition</li> <li>■ Changes in market share</li> </ul>		0%	10%	15%		
			Quality of external growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Quality of acquisitions pipeline</li> <li>■ Emphasis on multiples paid</li> <li>■ Quality of integration (in the short and medium term)</li> </ul>		0%	5%	7.5%
					People development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Development of talent and succession planning for key managers</li> <li>■ Talent attraction and employer branding initiatives</li> </ul>		0%
	<b>QUALITATIVE TOTAL</b>						<b>0%</b>	<b>20%</b>
	<b>TOTAL VARIABLE AS A % OF FIXED COMPENSATION</b>				<b>0%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>150%</b>	

(1) The Group's 2025-2027 CSR Roadmap published on March 25, 2025 is based on five pillars:

- promoting diversity and inclusion;
- mitigating climate change;
- developing a more circular economy;
- serving our customers;
- being a responsible business.

For more details on the 2025-2027 objectives in the Group's CSR Roadmap, and especially the climate and environmental objectives, please refer to the press release dated March 25, 2025 and to chapters 1 and 4 of this Universal Registration Document.

## Long-term compensation of the Chief Executive Officer in respect of 2026

In respect of 2026, the Chief Executive Officer is a beneficiary of a performance share plan (the “**2026 Performance Share Plan**”).

Long-term compensation corresponds to 200% of the target amount of the annual fixed compensation, with a possible variation in the number of shares initially allotted between 0% and 150% of the initial allotment based on future achievement of performance criteria.

The nature of the performance criteria has not been altered by comparison with the 2025 compensation policy. The Board of Directors considered that the performance criteria were aligned with the Group's medium-term strategy and the medium-term value creation targets, in keeping with best governance practices.

### Performance criteria selected for long-term variable compensation and target-setting method

The **first two** performance **criteria** are aligned with the Company's 2030 Ambitions as announced to the market at

the Capital Markets Day on September 24, 2024. They relate to sales growth excluding currency effects and the adjusted operating margin after acquisitions. These indicators lie at the heart of Legrand's business model based on profitable growth.

The **third criterion** is of a non-financial nature, based on the achievement of the Group's corporate social responsibility commitments under its CSR Roadmap. The CSR Roadmap lies at the heart of Legrand's business model and aims to ensure sustainable and responsible growth, with due regard for all stakeholders.

The **fourth criterion** is based on the performance of Legrand's share price relative to the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index. If the share price underperforms the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index (as described in point 4 below), no payment is made in relation to this criterion.

The proposed performance criteria thus reflect the Company's model based on profitable, sustainable and responsible growth aligned with the interests of all stakeholders.

Performance criteria	Description of performance criteria and target-setting method	Weighting of performance criteria
Sales growth target excluding currency effects	Comparison between the target and the average achievement over 3 years	1/4
Target for adjusted operating margin after acquisitions	Comparison between the target and the average achievement over 3 years	1/4
Annual achievement rates of the Group's CSR Roadmap <sup>(1)</sup>	Target: arithmetic mean over 3 years of the Group's annual CSR Roadmap achievement rates	1/4
Legrand's share price performance relative to the performance of the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index	Performance gap between Legrand's share price and the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index over a 3-year period	1/4

(1) For further details on the Group's CSR Roadmap targets for 2025-2027, and in particular on the climate and environmental targets, please refer to the press release of March 25, 2025 and to chapters 1 and 4 of this Universal Registration Document.

Performance criteria are measured over a three-year period. The number of performance shares awarded definitively to the Chief Executive Officer is calculated using the following method:

### 1) Sales growth criterion excluding currency effects

Pay-out rate <sup>(1)</sup>	0%	50%	100%	150%	150%
3-year average achievements in the year of implementation of the plan and the following 2 years	Below 4%	4%	8%	12%	Above 12%

(1) For any point between the limits stated in the above table, the pay-out rate is calculated on a straight-line basis.

### 2) Adjusted operating margin after acquisitions criterion

Pay-out rate <sup>(1)</sup>	0%	50%	100%	150%	150%
3-year average achievements in the year of implementation of the plan and the following 2 years	Below 19.5%	19.5%	20%	20.5%	Above 20.5%

(1) For any point between the limits stated in the above table, the pay-out rate is calculated on a straight-line basis.

### 3) Annual achievement rates of the Group's CSR Roadmap

Pay-out rate <sup>(1)</sup>	0%	70%	100%	150%	150%
Arithmetic mean over a 3-year period of the annual CSR Roadmap achievement rates	Below 70%	70%	100%	150%	Above 150%

(1) For any point between the limits stated in the above table, the pay-out rate is calculated on a straight-line basis.

### 4) Legrand's share price performance

Pay-out rate <sup>(1)</sup>	0%	50%	100%	150%	150%
Performance gap between Legrand's share price and the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index <sup>(2)</sup>	Below 0 point	Equal to 0 point	Equal to 5 points	Equal to 10 points	Above 10 points

(1) For any point between the limits stated in the above table, the pay-out rate is calculated on a straight-line basis.

(2) For the 2026 Performance Share Plan, 3-year performance will be measured over the 2026-2028 period using the following calculation method:

- Legrand's share price performance: comparison of the average daily closing prices in the second half of the third year of the plan (second half of 2028) to the average daily closing market prices in the second half of the year preceding the first year of the plan (second half of 2025), i.e., €132.02;
- performance of the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index: comparison of the average EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services daily closing indices in the second half of the third year of the plan (second half of 2028) to the average closing indices of the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index in the second half of the year preceding the first year of the plan (second half of 2025), i.e. 1,595.80 points.

The difference between these two performances will be measured by the difference, in percentage points, between the change in the Legrand's share price and the change in the EURO STOXX Industrial Goods & Services index.

#### Vesting period and fate of performance shares in the event of the departure of the Chief Executive Officer before the end of the vesting period

The vesting period for the Chief Executive Officer is three years. The (additional) holding period is two years. At the end of the vesting period of the performance shares allotted in 2026, the performance criteria and the condition of continuing service will be verified. The rules applicable in the event of the Chief Executive Officer's departure prior to the expiration of the vesting period are presented under the "Long-term compensation in respect of 2024 and 2025" heading in section 6.2.3.2 of this Universal Registration Document.

#### Holding obligation

Pursuant to Article L.22-10-59 of the French Commercial Code, as specified in the Code of Corporate Governance, the Chief Executive Officer must retain in registered form a certain percentage of the shares allocated until his term of office ends. The Board of Directors decided that the Chief Executive Officer will be required to hold at least 30% of all performance shares acquired under performance shares plans until his term of office ends.

#### Formal undertaking not to engage in hedging transactions

The Company has not put in place any hedging instruments for performance shares. Furthermore, the Chief Executive Officer has formally undertaken to refrain from using any hedging instruments in relation to the performance shares allocated to him.

## D – Other elements of the compensation policy

### Compensation for duties as a director of the Company and for directorships at other Group companies

No compensation is awarded to the Chief Executive Officer for his duties as a director of the Company or of any other Group companies.

### Exceptional compensation

There are no provisions for exceptional compensation.

### Undertakings covered by the provisions of Article L.22-10-9, I, 4° of the French Commercial Code

#### Pension plans

There is no undertaking under defined-benefit pension plans.

The Chief Executive Officer continues to benefit from the mandatory collective defined-contribution pension plan that falls within the scope of supplementary Article 83 of the FGTC. The Chief Executive Officer was a member of that plan before his appointment and continues to benefit from it under the same terms as all other relevant employees.

All the Group's French executives qualify for the benefit of the defined-contribution pension plan. Contributions are based on the A, B and C Tranches of compensation as defined for the calculation of contributions to the mandatory supplementary pension plans (AGIRC-ARRCO). Entitlements accrue through the payment of annual contributions equal to 1.5% of the A, B and C Tranches. The Company pays half this amount (0.75%) and the beneficiaries pay the other half (0.75%).

For 2026, the Company's contribution for the Chief Executive Officer is estimated at €2,884. This amount is given for information purposes only.

### Termination benefits

The Chief Executive Officer does not benefit from any undertaking covering compensation components, indemnities or other benefits that are or may be due in the event of or subsequent to the termination of his term of office or assignment to a different position ("golden parachutes"). No such undertaking covers him, including if control of the Company changes.

### Non-compete clause

Given the profile of the Chief Executive Officer and to protect the interests of the Company and its shareholders, in its meeting of March 20, 2018, the Board of Directors approved a non-compete agreement between the Company and the Chief Executive Officer. Under that agreement, the Chief Executive Officer undertakes not to carry out any activity that will compete with Legrand's business for a one-year period starting from the date his term of office ends.

The Company's Board of Directors will decide whether or not to apply this non-compete clause when the Chief Executive Officer's term of office ends. It may unilaterally decide to waive the application of this clause.

If applied, the Chief Executive Officer's fulfillment of this undertaking would result, for a one-year period after the end of his term of office, in the payment by the Company of a monthly indemnity. The latter would be equal to the monthly average of the reference salary received during the last 12 months of employment by the Company. The reference salary includes the fixed salary and annual variable compensation excluding sums received as long-term variable compensation. This amount is below the maximum cap recommended by the Code of Corporate Governance.

In accordance with Article R.22-10-14, III of the French Commercial Code, no indemnity would be payable under this non-compete clause should the Chief Executive Officer

decide to retire. In accordance with the Code of Corporate Governance, no indemnity may be paid if the Chief Executive Officer is aged over 65.

### Incentive and profit-sharing plans

The Company has for many years implemented an incentive and profit-sharing plan covering all its employees and those of its main French subsidiaries. The Chief Executive Officer has not enjoyed the benefit of this plan since he was appointed as Chief Executive Officer on February 8, 2018.

### Other non-cash forms of compensation components (company car, pension plan, supplementary health insurance coverage)

The Chief Executive Officer benefits from a company car. The benefit in kind for the provision of the company car is estimated to be worth €6,135 for 2026. This amount is given for information purposes only.

Furthermore, the Board of Directors, on February 7, 2018 decided that the Chief Executive Officer would continue to benefit from the "medical expenses" supplementary health insurance and the "death, disability and inability to work" insurance available to the Group's French executives under exactly the same terms since he is classified as an executive for social security and tax purposes.

For 2026, the Company's contribution for Benoît Coquart is estimated at €7,796. This amount is given for information purposes only.

### Clawback clause

The Board of Directors, on the advice of the Compensation Committee, may decide not to pay or to request the return of all or part of the annual and long-term variable compensation in the event of (i) fraud by the Chief Executive Officer and/or (ii) gross misconduct by the Chief Executive Officer having a material negative impact on the Group.

## 6.2.2.3 Compensation policy applicable to the directors in respect of 2026

### A – Directors' term of office

Directors are appointed by the Shareholders' Meeting for a term of office of three years, subject to the provisions of the Articles of Association concerning the age limit and the provisions of law and of the Code of Corporate Governance on multiple directorships. They may be reappointed without limitation subject to fulfilling the same requirements.

Directors may resign from their office at any time without giving any notice. Directors may be dismissed at any time by the Shareholders' Meeting without any notice. The duties of the directors representing employees come to an end prematurely in the event of the termination of their employment contract.

### B – Compensation of the directors in respect of 2026

The Board of Directors apportions directors' compensation on the recommendation of the Compensation Committee and based on the total amount authorized by the Shareholders' Meeting. The total amount authorized by the Shareholders' Meeting of May 29, 2024, was €1,300,000. It will remain valid until a new resolution setting out a new amount is adopted by the Shareholders' Meeting.

On the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, the Board of Directors decided on March 18, 2026 to increase the total allocation for directors' compensation to €1,600,000. The increase in the allocation is intended to reflect (i) any potential additional meetings of the Board and its committees in light of current developments within the Group, and (ii) the inclusion of an amount of €70,583 corresponding to the overrun against the applicable 2025 allocation (set at €1,300,000).

The €70,583 overrun in respect of 2025, which arose from the holding of additional meetings of the Board and its committees<sup>(1)</sup> not originally scheduled and linked to current developments within the Group, is included in the 2026 compensation policy. It will be drawn from the 2026 compensation allocation and paid at the close of the Shareholders' Meeting of May 27, 2026, subject to shareholder approval of the ninth and tenth resolutions.

For further information about the determination of the maximum amount of compensation allotted to members of the Board of Directors, please refer to the presentation of the agenda and the proposed resolutions available on the Company's website: [www.legrand.com/en](http://www.legrand.com/en) in the "INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS/Shareholders' meetings/2026 General Meeting" section.

It should be noted that neither the Chair of the Board of Directors nor the Chief Executive Officer receives any compensation for their duties as directors of the Company.

Accordingly, the compensation is apportioned between the other directors including the two directors representing employees.

The apportionment of compensation between directors takes into account directors' actual attendance at meetings of the Board of Directors and of its specialized committees. Additional compensation may be awarded, or exceptional compensation paid, for specific duties, such as those of the Lead Director.

On the recommendation of the Compensation Committee, the Board of Directors decided on March 18, 2026 to leave directors' fixed compensation unchanged. It has decided to amend the variable portion for each attendance at exceptional meeting of the Board of Directors effective as of the 2026 financial year. The 2026 compensation policy for directors is as follows:

- €25,000 a year in respect of the fixed portion of directors' compensation. The sum is increased by:
  - €5,000 for attendance at every regular meeting of the Board of Directors;
  - €2,500 for attendance at every exceptional meeting of the Board of Directors.

- €3,000 for each director who is also a member of a specialized committee for attendance at each specialized committee meeting;
- an additional €20,000 is paid to the Chair of the Audit Committee and an additional €10,000 is paid to the Chairs of the other specialized committees; and
- an additional €2,500 per trip is paid to directors residing outside Europe, in addition to variable compensation. This sum would not be paid in the event of participation via videoconference or telecommunication.

These rules for apportioning directors' compensation are in line with the Code of Corporate Governance, which recommends that the variable portion of the compensation awarded to directors should predominate.

Should the Board of Directors decide to entrust any director with specific duties or a specific term of office, they may be awarded exceptional compensation. Its amount will be proportionate for such duties or term of office and in line with market practices.

Given the specific duties discharged by the Lead Director, the Board of Directors has decided to award him an additional compensation of €20,000. Information regarding the Lead Director's duties is provided in section 6.1.2 of this Universal Registration Document.

In accordance with the Directors' Charter within the Internal Rules, the minimum number of shares that a director must hold in a personal capacity and retain throughout their term of office is 500 shares. All directors must, during their terms of office, gradually acquire a number of shares equivalent to one year's compensation (calculated assuming their attendance at all meetings of the Board and committees to which they belong and based on the average share price of Legrand shares for the previous financial year as the unit value).

Lastly, each director is entitled to reimbursement, upon presentation of supporting documents, of any travel and journey expenses incurred in the course of their duties, subject to the limits set out in the Company's applicable policy.

(1) For more details about meetings of the Board of Directors and its committees, please refer to section 6.1.1.3 "Work performed by the Board of Directors in 2025" and 6.1.3.3 "Work performed by the Board of Directors' specialized committees in 2025" of section 6.1 of this Universal Registration Document.